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DETERRING l\llSUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION:
A PROPOSED CITIZENS' ACTION
Joseph ]. Kalo*
HE federal government, in order to plan federal programs and
formulate policy for the public benefit, compiles great stores of
information through its innumerable departments and agencies.
Many government employees will have access to this information
in the course of their official duties, and valid objectives may require
that much information be permanently or temporarily withheld
from outsiders. It is expected that a government employee will neither attempt to use confidential government information1 for his own
gain nor improperly disclose the information for use by others.2
When an employee breaches this confidence his act constitutes more
than a moral wrong; it may cause significant economic injury either
to the government or to particular individuals, and it may have
grave social effects. Consequently, feasible methods of preventing
misappropriation or disclosure of confidential government information must be develope~ and applied.
Part I of this article offers two examples-predicated on historical fact8-that illustrate the possible adverse consequences of dis-
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1. As used in this Article, "confidential government information" means "information
obtained under Government authority which has not become part of the body of public
information." 5 C.F.R. § 734.03(2) (1973).
Some confidential government information is analogous to trade secrets, a type of
confidential information that the employee of a business concern is under a duty not
to disclose or make use of for personal gain. See REsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 200,
Illustration 1 (1937); 5 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUsrs §§ 505.1, 506 (3d ed. 1967).
2. This Article discusses only situations in which a government employee or a
third-party recipient uses confidential information for private financial profit. The
discussion may be irrelevant for cases in which disclosures of confidential information
are made for political purposes, as illustrated by the Pentagon Papers case, New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
3. The first example is based upon reports that in August 1972 six grain exporters
were notified by a Department of Agriculture employee of an impending change in
export subsidy rates on sales of United States wheat to the Soviet Union. The grain
exporters allegedly used this information to reap a windfall of approximately 92 million
dollars. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 4 (late city ed.); id., Sept. 15, 1972, at
1, col. 1 (late city ed.); Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1972, at 17, col. 2 (eastern ed.). The results
of official attempts to recover the excess subsidy payments are not known. See U.S.
DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, Pub. No. 8383-72, FACI"S ABour THE RUSSIAN GRAIN SALE 6 (1972)
(interview with Secretary of Agriculture Butz) [hereinafter Butz Interview].
The second example is based upon the case of Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910),
and the companion cases of Peckham v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 483 (1910), and Price y_.
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closure of confidential government information. Part I also examines
present statutory and regulatory safeguards against such disclosure
and analyzes their effect. Part II sets forth a proposal for reducing
the possibility that confidential government information will be improperly used and for recouping government losses by means of a
citizens' action. when it is so used.
!.

MISUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

REMEDIES UNDER PRESENT LAW
A. The Potential for Misuse

AND

Although opportunities for misuse of confidential information
abound,4 illustrations from the area of government programs affecting the marketing of agricultural products adequately demonstrate
the potential for and the possible consequences of misuse of information. Pursuant to federal regulations, the Department of Agriculture
(Department) may pay a subsidy to wheat exporters based on the
quantity of their wheat export shipments.11 The subsidy is part of a
comprehensive government policy designed to maintain domestic
wheat prices at a level that provides American wheat farmers with a
fair return but allows excess grain to be exported at lower world
prices. 6 The amount of the payment depends upon the Department's
Henkel, 216 U.S. 488 (1910). The cases involved an associate statistician in the Department of Agriculture who was bribed to falsify official cotton reports and to disclose in
advance to other defendants the true contents of the report. The Supreme Court
held that the indictment charged an offense of conspiracy to defraud the United States
even though the United States had not suffered pecuniary loss.
4. Accurate statistical data on the frequency of improper disclosures of confidential
government information by government employees do not exist. There is evidence
that such disclosures do occur, see, e.g., materials cited note 3 supra, but it is probable
that many disclosures go undetected, unreported, or unprosecuted.
Even if precise data could be obtained, evaluation of the problem at the quantitative
level only is inadequate. The qualitative effect-the effect of unprosecuted instances
of misuse of confidential government information on the public's perceptions of
government efficacy, on the integrity of the system of justice, and on the government's
capacity adequately to serve the perceived needs of the people, all manifested in the
degree of public confidence in government and in the government's ability to obtain
cooperation and trust-is at least as significant as the number of disclosures, Discovered
but unprosecuted instances of misuse are publicized by the mass media and are the
basis upon which public opinion is formed. If uncorrected, publicized misuse of
confidential government information for personal gain has a potentially adverse
socio-political effect upon the relationship of the government and the people, the
problem deserves attention regardless of the number of violations.
5. See 7 C.F.R. § 1483.104 (1978) (allows a base subsidy of zero and permits different
rates for different coasts or ports of export, different classes and qualities of wheat,
different destinations, and different export periods); Wheat Subsidies: A Game Rigged
Against the House, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 23, 1972, at 23 [hereinafter Bus. WEEK),
6. See T. Nichols, Feed Grains and Wheat Situation and Outlook 13 (unpublished
working materials 1972); Butz Interview, supra note 3, at 2-4. See generally D. HADWIGER,
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determination of the support necessary to permit wheat exporters to
purchase at the traditionally higher domestic price and still export
at the lower world price.7 At the time he purchases goods £or overseas
delivery, the exporter may register with the Department the quantity
of wheat he will ship and the purchase price per bushel. If the purchase qualifies, the exporter receives a subsidy payment determined
in accordance with current Department policies and guidelines.8
Assume that in July 1973 the Department had been paying a subsidy of fifty cents per bushel on all registered wheat export shipments.
A Department report completed on July 10, 1973 finds that the
world market price has risen to ·within thirty cents of the higher
domestic price, and a decision is therefore made that beginning the
next morning the Department will reduce the subsidy to thirty cents
per bushel. It is further decided that a public statement to this effect
will be released on July 11, before the opening of the grain commodity market. After the meeting, a Department employee telephones three large wheat exporters and notifies them of the planned
change. Knowing that under current conditions the world price will
probably remain steady, the wheat exporters immediately purchase
1,000,000 bushels of wheat for delivery and export in late July. The
purchases are timely registered and qualify £or subsidy payments of
500,000 dollars.
The resultant economic injury is clear. By receiving advance
notice the wheat exporters obtained 200,000 dollars from the public
treasury that would not otherwise have been paid, and that need not
have been paid to achieve the goal of stabilizing wheat prices at the
desired level.9
The ·wrongdoers in the above example are the government employee and the wheat exporters who knowingly used the confidential
FEDERAL WHEAT COMMODITY PROGRAMS (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1329, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970); S. REP. No. 1154, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).

7. See 7 C.F.R. § 1483.102(a) (1973); Bus. WEEK, supra note 5 (export subsidies
equal difference between domestic and world price).
8. Technically the wheat exporter submits an offer to the Commodity Credit Corporation. Acceptance of the offer forms a contract under which the exporter agrees to
export the stated quantity of wheat in consideration for an export subsidy payment.
7 C.F.R. §§ 1483.102(a), .110 (1973). The payment rate per bushel is the rate in effect
when the offer is submitted to the Commodity Credit Corporation. The exporter files
an application for payment with documentary evidence of the export. 7 C.F.R.
§§ 1483.102(d), .163 (1973). See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1483.130-.139 (1973); Bus. WEEK, supra note
5, at 23.
9. A variation of the above hypothetical finds the government employee himself
purchasing wheat and registering it for the subsidy before the public announcement of
the change in departmental policy. This action would violate departmental regulations.
See 7 C.F.R. § 0.73!>-20(a) (1973).
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information before the public announcement. There are three injured parties: the government, which has paid more in subsidies than
it otherwise would have paid; the taxpayers, who will ultimately
bear the cost of excess subsidy payments; and other wheat exporters,
who may now be at a competitive disadvantage.10
A second example of misappropriation of government information, which involves no immediate economic injury either to the
government or to taxpayers, deserves consideration. The Department
of Agriculture compiles statistics and prepares a report relating to
the probable quality, quantity, and market price of future crops.11
Because the Department report is accurate, it has an admitted impact
upon the wheat market; 12 consequently, it is available only to authorized personnel18 until the Department distributes the information
to the public.
Assume that such a report predicts that wheat prices will rise, and
a departmental statistician reveals the contents or delivers copies of
the report to several wheat future traders prior to public disclosure.14
Armed with this information the traders make a number of highly
advantageous purchases on the wheat market.15
Again the wrongdoers are the government employee and the
wheat traders who made use of the information. The injured parties
and the nature of the injuries, however, vary from those of the previous example. Wheat farmers are injured to the extent that they
receive less than the price at which their wheat would have sold if
the information had been publicly disclosed. Other wheat traders
are harmed to the extent that the recipients of the report acquired a
more advantageous competitive position by purchasing the commodity at a lower price. Neither the government nor taxpayers as a
group suffer immediate economic injury. We cannot, however, rule
out future economic injury. If farmers sell great quantities of wheat
to exporters who would have purchased at a higher price had they
10. Domestic consumers could be harmed if the exporters purchased much more
wheat than they otherwise would have bought. The purchases would diminish the
supply of wheat for domestic use, possibly resulting in increased prices.
ll. 7 U.S.C. § 411a (1970). See 44 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 471 (1970)
(annual cotton report); 7 U.S.C. § 501 (1970) (annual tobacco report with quarterly
summations); 7 U.S.C. § 2248 (1970) (annual turpentine and rosin report); 7 C.F.R.
§§ 1300.1-.4 (1973) (monthly peanut report).
12. See Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 478 (1910). See generally D. HADWicER, supra
note 6.
13. See 7 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1973).
14. This act would violate Department of Agriculture regulations. See 7 C.F.R.
§ 0.735-20 (1973).
15. The government employee could, of course, illegally use the information himself.
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not become privy to inside information the government may eventnally be forced to make up the farmers' loss in the form of increased
wheat subsidy payments.
B.

The Government Employee as a Fiduciary Agent

The basic tools for the prevention of abuses such as those described above, and the basis of the legal consequences that follow,
are the principles governing fiduciary relationships. These principles have been applied to many situations that involve an entrustment by one person (the principal) to another (the fiduciary agent)
of the authority to control or manage all or part of the principal's
property or affairs.16 They impose upon the fiduciary agent an enforceable duty of absolute loyalty, which requires him to act solely
in the best interests of the principal in the management of the latter's
affairs.17 Furthermore, any confidential information acquired by the
agent as a consequence of the fiduciary relationship may not be communicated to third parties or used by the agent for his own benefit
without the principal's authorization.18
The application of fiduciary duties to activities of government
employees is not novel.19 It reflects not only a desire to avoid eco16. Common examples of fiduciary relationships are guardian and ward, e.g.,
American Sur. Co. v. Hayden, 112 Fla. 17, 150 S. 114 (1933); attorney and client, e.g.,
In re Goldstein, 46 Del. 450, 85 A.2d 361 (1951); executor or administrator and decedent's legatees or next of kin, e.g., Michaud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503 (1846); directors and officers of a corporation and the corporation or its shareholders, e.g., Brophy
v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); and agent and principal, e.g.,
Jansen v. Williams, 36 Neb. 869, 55 N.W. 279 (1893). See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE I.Aw OF REMEDIES § 10.4 (1973); Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L
REv. 539 (1949).
17. D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 10.4; REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY, Introductory
Note to Chapter 13 (1958); id. §§ 13-14.
18. D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 10.4; REsrATEMENT OF R:EsrrrUTION § 200 (1937);
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958); 5 A. Sco-rr, supra note 1, § 505.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1919); J. KIRBY, CONGRESS AND
THE PUBLIC TRUST 34-43 (1970). In Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13
(1927), the Supreme Court affirmed a district court decision entitling the government to
cancel a lease of the Naval Petroleum Reserve. The government representative who
handled the transactions had conspired with the lessee in disregard of official policy
concerning preservation of oil reserves and in a m:i;imer that favored the lessee over
other competitors without accounting for government interests. See also Coos County
v. Elrod, 125 Ore. 409, 416, 267 P. 530, 532-33 (1928) (county employee had fiduciary
obligation to disclose to superiors that he accepted a low bid in a tax sale and discouraged others from submitting high bids).
.
Numerous cases have stated that a public office is a public trust created in the
interest and for the benefit of the people. See, e.g., Crocker v. United States, 240 U.S.
74, 79-80 (1915); Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 272-73 (1880); Trist v. Child, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 450 (1874) (dictum); Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 10
N.J. Super. 545, 567, 77 A.2d 255, 265 (Ch. 1950). See generally Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as a Remedy for Corruption in Public Office, 54 CoLUM, L REv. 214 (1954);
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nomic costs such as those discussed in the foregoing examples, but
moral20 and functional21 concerns. Three related moral beliefs shape
the public's opinion on the proper uses of confidential government
information. First, deeply engrained in the American people is a
belief that public office, and confidential information acquired as a
result of holding such office, should not be used for private gain.22
Second, strongly felt notions of fair play, free competition, and equal55 CoLUM. L REv. 1085, 1086 (1955): 40 MINN. L. REv. 880 (1956). The "public trust"
concept is another way of stating that the public employee is a fiduciary agent.
20. The Supreme Court articulated the moral basis for imposing duties upon fidu•
ciaries in Michaud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503, 555 (1846): "The general rule stands
upon our great moral obligation to refrain from placing ourselves in relations which
ordinarily excite a conflict between self-interest and integrity. It restrains all agents,
public and private ••••" See also United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co,,
364 U.S. 520, 549 (1961), in which the Court interpreted a federal conflict of interest
statute and stated: "The moral principle upon which the statute is based has its
foundation in the Biblical admonition that no man may serve two masters, Matt,
6:24, a maxim which is especially pertinent if one of the masters happens to be
economic self-interest."
21. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395, comment a (1958), states that part of
the rationale for restricting a fiduciary's use of confidential information is the need
to maintain "the freedom of communication which should exist between the principal
and his agent," In the same vein, the Supreme Court has stated that federal conflict
of interest statutes seek to "prohibit government officials from engaging in conduct
that might be inimical to the best interests of the general public." United States v.
Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 548 (1961),
22. In August 1973 the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the U.S.
Senate Committee on Government Operations engaged the public opinion firm of Louis
Harris & Associates, Inc. to measure public attitudes relating to the responsiveness and
efficiency of government. The completed survey and accompanying analysis was pub•
lished in a committee print. SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF THE U.S.
SENATE CoM?lr. ON GoVERNMENT OPERATIONS, CONFIDENCE AND CONCERN: CITIZENS VIEW
.AMERICAN GoVERNMENT, 93d CONG., 1st SESS. pt. 1 (1973) [hereinafter Sunco11111r. ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS]. Fifty-seven per cent of the people surveyed stated they
had less confidence in the federal government than they had five years ago. The main
reason given by surveyed public officials for lack of confidence in the federal govern•
ment was "corruption, use of office and public funds for personal gain." Id. at 47, 221,
223. The report of the New York Bar Association on federal conflict of interest legisla•
tion more fully states this moral belief:
[I]t is possible to imagine the case of an official who acts impartially, does not play
favorites, and is a model of public decorum, but who, for example, speculates on
the grain market on the basis-of inside government information. The universal
condemnation of such action indicates that the prevention of the use of public
office for private gain is an independent and separate objective involved m the
field of official conflicts of interest.
AssoCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRK, CoNFLicr OF INTEREST AND F.EDERAL
SERVICE 7 (1960) [hereinafter ABCNY]. See also United States v. Mississippi Valley Gen•
crating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549-50 (1961); Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 10
N.J. Super. 545, 567, 77 A.2d 255, 265-66 (Ch. 1950); 5 C.F.R. § 735.101 (1973): R. GETZ,
CONGRESSIONAL Ennes 7-8 (1966); STAFF REPORT TO SuncOMM, No. Ii OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG,, 2D SEss., FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREsr l.EGJSLA•
noN 19 (Comm. Print 1958) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT]; Harris, Attitudes Changing on
Types of People Thought Harmful to Country (Harris Survey, Oct. 1, 1973).
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ity of men under the law make objectionable the prospect that certain individuals will receive government information on the basis
of whom they know.23 Finally, government information that has been
obtained through the use of public funds and personnel is perceived
as a public asset, which if disclosed should be shared by all.24
These beliefs are buttressed by concern for the functional ramifications of the misuse of information. Government requires public
cooperation- and confidence at several stages of the decision-making
process. In many circumstances accumulation of information upon
which policy is based depends upon voluntary compliance with
governmental reporting schemes.25 If individuals fear that the information they provide will be used to their economic disadvantage,
perhaps through disclosure to other parties, they may refuse to cooperate unless faced ·with substantial additional government enforcement efforts.26 Such efforts might divert funds from other equally
important activities, and the higher cost of the data might make programs requiring data collection infeasible or undesirable. 27
Misuse of data may further hinder implementation of federal
programs. Unchecked, such misuse may lower popular opinion of
the government as an effective vehicle for obtaining public objectives. This would make it more difficult for the government to obtain
the public cooperation essential to effectuate its policies and programs.2s
23. "A government that plays favorites among its citizens is fundamentally objectionable to American conceptions of the equality of men under the law, notions of fair
play, and the assumptions of free competition. Few things make an American citizen
angrier than to find out that he did not get a fair shake; and a secret personal interest
of a deciding official is a kind of dice loading." ABCNY, supra note 22, at 6. See also
R. GETZ, supra note 22, at 4; Note, The Federal Conflicts of Interests Statutes and the
Fiduciary Principle, 14 VAND. L REv. 1485, 1502 {1961).
24. See 5 C.F.R. § 735.206 (1973); materials cited notes 22-23 supra.
25. The success of almost every executive or legislative directive requires the cooperation of the public. See ABCNY, supra note 22, at 6-7. Cf. J. CHOMMIE, THE LAW
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 6 (2d ed. 1973).
26. See A. Mnl.ER, THE AssAULT ON PRIVAcY 129-30, 132-35, 156 (1971).
27. See Feldman&: Kanter, Organizational Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF 0RGA·
NIZATIONS 614, 621 ij, March ed. 1965). Cf. R. HALL, ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE AND
PROCFSS 176 (1972); Novick, Decision Making in the Department of Defense, 15 Bus.
HoRIZONs, Dec. 1972, at 23. See generally Prest &: Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Survey, 75 ECON. J. 683 (1965).
28. See SUBCOl\lM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 22, at 24-27; What
America Thinks of Itself, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 1973, at 40.
Courts have recognized that trust in the integrity of government employees is
essential to achieving government policy objectives. In Haas
Henkel, 216 U.S. 462
(1910), a Department of Agriculture employee conspired to falsify Department cotton
reports, which normally have a substantial effect upon cotton prices. Activity of this
nature would "deprive these reports of most of their value to the public and degrade

v.
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Fiduciary principles seek to ensure that government employees
behave consistently with these moral and functional concerns by
eliminating the possibility of improper pecuniary gain. 20 Regardless
of whether the government can prove actual financial loss, an employee who uses confidential information for his o·wn financial
advantage is liable to the government for all profits so acquired. 80
Furthermore, if the government can prove an actual loss, it may
seek remuneration from the employee.81
Personal civil liability, however, is of little practical value if the
employee has not personally profited from the misuse of the inforthe department in general estimation ••••" 216 U.S. at 479. In Reading v. AttorneyGeneral, [1951) A.C. 507, an army officer was paid to ride on a truck carrying blackmarket goods in Cairo during World War II. The court held that the Crown could
recover the money the officer had received. At least one rationale for the opinion was
the belief that such activities, even if they caused no direct injury to the Crown, would
lower the public opinion of the military. But cf. Harris, Americans Willing To Mal,e
Sacrifice To Conserve Energy (Harris Survey, Dec. 3, 1973).
The Civil Service Commission prefaces its regulations concerning employee responsibilities and conduct with the statement that "[t]he maintenance of unusually high
standards of honesty, integrity, impartiality, and conduct by Government employees
and special Government employees is essential to assure ••• the maintenance of confidence by citizens in their Government." 5 C.F.R. § 735.101 (1973). To the same effect,
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York concluded: "Ultimately every
government depends upon the confidence of its people. This is most obviously the
case in a democracy. If the people are persuaded that government officials use their
office unfairly and for personal rather than public advantage, government by consent
of the governed and voluntary compliance with government orders become virtually
unattainable." ABCNY, supra note 22, at 6-7. Cf. Harris, 54% Say They Ha'l/e "Less
Trust" in Public Officials (Harris Survey, Oct. 18, 1973); Harris, Nixon Rating Shows
No Change in Month Despite Growing Scandal (Harris Survey, June 28, 1973); Mathews
&: Sullivan, Criminal Liability for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: The National Commission's Proposed Federal Criminal Code, S. 1, and S. 1400, 11 AM. Crullf.
L. R.Ev. 883, 900-01 (1973); Chicago Tribune, Nov. 25, 1971, at 26, col. 3 (final ed.).
29. Misuse could also be curtailed by limiting severely the number of employees
with access to confidential information. Limiting access may have adverse consequences, however. Decision makers may be deprived of valuable evaluations of de•
cisional data and policy assessments by employees and consultants. ABCNY, supra note
22, at 163-64. See generally id. at 165-79; R. HALL, supra note 27; Peabody & Rourke,
Public Bureaucracies, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 27, at 802. Also, different agencies are often directed to coordinate efforts to implement a program or
policy more effectively. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1736(a) (1970) (food for peace program).
Cf. Kricsberg, Organizations and Interprofessional Cooperation, in COMPARATIVE ORGA•
NIZATIONS (W. Heydebrand ed. 1973) at 242, 267-68. Coordination cannot be achieved
unless large numbers of employees are privy to confidential information. Thus, increasing rather than decreasing the number of employees who have access to information
may be essential to the effectiveness of the decision-making process and the accomplishment of government goals.
30. United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1919). See also lu:.,rATEMENT OF R.EsnruTION § 200 (1937); R.Esl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 (1958); 5 A. Scorr, supra
note 1, §§ 505, 505.1. See generally Note, supra note 23.
31. See materials cited note 30 supra. See also R.Esl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 404 (1958). If the principal suffers an actual loss and the fiduciary agent has received
a profit by reason of the breach of duty, the principal may have to elect between suing
for his losses or for recovery of profits. Id. § 407.
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mation, since few employees have sufficient assets to satisfy a large
judgment. Fiduciary principles are thus augmented by the doctrine
that acceptance of confidential information by a third party knowing
of its confidentiality makes him liable for the principal's actual losses
under a theory of tortious interference with a fiduciary relationship. 82 Furthermore, even if the principal cannot prove actual losses,
the third party must disgorge any profits obtained through the use
of the information under the theory of unjust enrichment, which
declares the third party to be the constructive trustee of the profits
for the benefit of the principal.38 These remedies recognize that the
fiduciary relationship is important, that the fiduciary agent may be
unable to compensate the principal fully, and that third parties
should be legally forced to respect the relationship. They are also
appropriate because in most cases appropriation of confidential information would not occur without the participation of a third-patty
recipient.84 Stripping the recipient of his illicit gains or forcing him
to pay the government's losses substantially reduces his motivation to
seek out or receive such information, and materially aids the achievement of fair, efficient government.85
C.

The Inadequacy of Current Legal Remedies for Abuse
of Fiduciary Duty by Government Employees
I. Civil Remedies

The civil remedies outlined above will neither prevent nor correct breaches of fiduciary duties unless the government vigorously
pursues its rights. This has not happened. Only a few reported cases
involve suits against government employees to recover money obtained as the result of a breach of a fiduciary obligation.86 On oc32. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1958); 5 A. SCOTT, supra note 1,
§ 506. It would be difficult for a third party who received confidential information to

defend on the ground that he did not know that the government employee was breaching a fiduciary duty by disclosing the information. Persons dealing with government
employees are under an affirmative duty to inquire and determine whether the government employee is acting consistently with his fiduciary duties. See Hume v. United
States, 132 U.S. 406, 414 (1889); Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 10 N.J. Super.
545, 569-'10, '17 A.2d 255, 267 (Ch. 1950).
33. See D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 10.4; REsTATEMENT OF REsrm.rnoN § 201(2)
(1937); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 312, comment c, at 51-52 (1958); 5 A. SCOTT,
supra note I, § 506. See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra, § 314.
34. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1919); B. MANNING, FEDERAL CoNFLicr
OF INTEREST LAW 270 (1964).
35. See B. MANNING, supra note 34, at 270. The importance of a sense of moral
responsibility in the economic development of a country is briefly explored in H.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET v-vi (1966).
36. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1919); United States v. Drumm, 329
F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1964) (action against poultry inspector for compensation received
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casion the government has successfully asserted the violation of a
government employee's fiduciary duty as the basis for the cancellation or rescission of a contract87 or as an affirmative defense to a lawsuit
brought to enforce a contract. 38 Aside from these cases, however, civil
suits against government employees or third-party participants in
the employee's breach 0£ fiduciary duties are nonexistent. The reasons for the government's failure actively to pursue its civil remedies
are difficult to ascertain. The allocation of investigative and legal
personnel always plays a significant role in litigation decisions, but
from poultry processor for consulting done while employed by the Department of
Agriculture); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1961) (action by United
States against civilian engineer for damages arising out of alleged promotion of per•
sonal interests while employed by United States); United States v. Drisko, 303 F, Supp.
858 (E.D. Va. 1969) (suit against Department of Agriculture employee to recover gratuities received for information and assistance given to partidpant in Department
programs), In Carter the defendant, an army captain and engineer, was placed in charge
of an operation to improve the Savannah harbor. His position allowed him to exercise
considerable discretion in planning, preparing, and modifying contracts; advertising for
and accepting bids; and supervising work. The government contracts were drawn so
as to leave the government the option of choosing work methods and the right to
substitute one material for another. The evidence showed that Carter granted contracts
to two contractors with whom he had made a secret agreement to divide net profits.
Upon discovery of the secret agreement the government brought suit to recover any
profits that Carter had received. Even though the government was unable to prove
any actual injury, it was allowed to recover on the theory that Carter had breached his
fiduciary duty. 217 U.S. at 298-300.
Application of fidudary prindples is necessary in cases such as Carter because of
the difficulty of proving actual wrongdoing in light of the discretionary nature of the
employee's duties; the belief that a personal interest will, despite the individual's
attempt to ignore it, affect his ability to make objective decisions; and the belief that
if completely objective decisions are not made the government is deprived of the full
benefit of the individual's skill, expertise, and mental capacities, which were the basis
for allowing him to exerdse discretion in the first place. See also Crocker v. United
States, 240 U.S. 74: (1916); Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880).
37. See United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961). A
narrow reading of this case would limit its application to situations in which a government employee violates a specific conflict of interest statute in connection with the
grant of a government contract. Such a reading would not reach the setting aside of
contracts procured through the use of confidential government information obtained
pursuant to a breach of a government employee's common law fiduciary duties.
38. See Crocker v. United States, 240 U.S. 74: (1916). This defense may be used by
nongovernment parties as well. See, e.g., Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880);
Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45 (1864:). One commentator has noted that
fw]ith relative frequency, court cases have arisen in which the plaintiff is suing
lor a fee for services and is met with the defense that the services rendered violate
the conflict of interest statutes. Apparently, no court has questioned the premise
underlying this defense. It seems to be unchallenged that if the services are in
violation of the conflict of interest statute, the third party for whom the services
were performed may raise the point as a defense and thus receive the services
without paying for them. If this were widely understood it might have some useful
preventive effect; but once the services have been performed, it does seem a strange
result to permit the third party-often the instigator of the transaction-to be the
beneficiary of the government employee's infraction,
B. MANNING, supra note 34, at 270.
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that factor alone cannot explain the paucity of civil litigation. There
are other possible explanations.
If the employee lacks sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment, a civil
suit against him may be deemed economically unwise despite its
prophylactic value. Imposition of administrative sanctions may be
judged more appropriate.39 Furthermore, a civil suit against the employee could create legislative, judicial, or public pressure to sue the
third party as well.40 Government officials may not wish to sue
the third party, and they may therefore forgo civil action against
the employee. In certain situations such forbearance may be justified
if one balances the rights of the government against those of innocent parties. For instance, cancellation or rescission of a prime contract obtained through misuse of confidential information may cause
substantial economic injury to subcontractors and others who have
acted in reliance upon the contract but who were not involved in the
wrongdoing.41 Concern for innocent parties, however, cannot always
justify failure to pursue available remedies. The government could
still sue the third-party recipient to recover its losses or the third
party's profits, often without causing injustice.42
Perhaps civil litigation is rare because all damages are recovered
through negotiation. More likely and more plausible, however, is
the possibility that suits are not filed because of political considerations. When the beneficiaries of misbegotten information are powerful industries or prominent individuals, it may be deemed politically
inexpedient to pursue civil claims in the absence of a sustained
public outcry.43 Whatever the explanation, civil litigation as a means
of enforcing the fiduciary obligations of government employees is
seldom used.44
39. But see text accoompanying notes 66-81 infra.
J. Sirica: Standing Firm for the Primacy of Law, TIME, Jan. 7,
1974, at 8, 11-14, 20 [hereinafter TIME].
41. See B. MANNING, supra note 34, at 269-71. Cf. United States v. Mississippi Valley
Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 564-65 (1961).
42. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
43. See, e.g., States-Item, Dec. 27, 1973, at A-5, col. 3 (New Orleans city ed.); Arizona
Republic, July 5, 1970, at 18-A, col. 1 (cases involving major government contractor
and several congressmen). Cf. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System:
An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1036, 1066-67 (1972)
(political influence as a factor in decision whether to prosecute criminals).
44. A partial step toward more stringent enforcement of the fiduciary duties of
government employees would be to accept the idea that the duties are owed to individual citizens as well as to the government. Those who experience direct economic injury
as a result of the employee's breach of duty could then sue individually or as a class
to recover their losses. For example, individual sellers of wheat in the hypothetical discussed in the text accompanying notes 11-15 supra may be able to trace their sales
40. Cf, Judge John
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2. Criminal Statutes

Federal criminal statutes provide another ostensible means of
deterring unauthorized disclosures of confidential information. Current statutes have little effect, however, in part because of limitations
in scope. Most federal conflict of interest statutes have as their target
either the acceptance of a bribe by a government employee in exchange for information45 or the participation by the employee in
outside activities that give the appearance that he has used his position of trust for personal gain.46 The statutes that do prohibit unauthorized disclosure of confidential information generally are
directed only at particular classes of government employees or employees of particular agencies.47 No federal statute makes criminal
either any willful disclosure of any confidential government information to a person not authorized to receive the information or the
misuse of any such information by the employee for personal gain.
If the history of the enforcement of conflict of interest statutes
is any gauge of the effectiveness of the criminal process as a deterrent
in this area, however, the enactment of a criminal statute expressly
to recipients of the unlawfully disclosed wheat crop reports. If the sellers can prove
that their wheat would have sold at a higher price if the information had not been
disclosed, they may be able to recover from the buyers the difference between the
actual price and the price they would have otherwise received. Problems of tracing
sales, proving damages, and even determining the injured parties, however, may make
such a suit impractical. The citizens' action proposed in Part II of this Article would
be a more effective and efficient means of enforcing the fiduciary obligations of govern•
ment employees.
45. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203 (1970).
46. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 205, 208 (1970); 19 U.S.C. § 1902 (1970).
47. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1901 (Treasury personnel), 1903 (Department of Agriculture
and Federal Crop Insurance Corporation employees), 1904 (Reconstruction Finance
Corporation employees), 1906 (bank examiners), 1907 (farm credit examiners) (1970).
One statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1902 (1970), is somewhat more broad. It prohibits any government employee from willfully disclosing official confidential government information
"which might influence or affect the market value of any product of the soil grown
within the United States" to any person not entitled to receive such information prior
to the time the information is made public through official channels. Speculation in the
product by the employee before the information is made public is also prohibited.
Neither disclosure nor speculation violates the statute, however, unless the employee
had actual knowledge of agency regulations requiring that the information be withheld,
Another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970), prohibits disclosure by any employee of
the United States of any information that "relates to the trade secrets, processes, op•
erations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data,
amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm,
partnership, corporation, or association." Although interpretive data are scarce, the
congressional intent was apparently to make criminal the divulgence by federal em•
ployees of information obtained from income tax returns or in connection with govern•
ment investigations or examinations. See, e.g., United States v. Stem, 418 F.2d 198 (2d
Cir. 1969). Disclosure of nonprivate information, such as a wheat report, would ap•
parently not be reached.
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prohibiting the disclosure of any confidential government information would not solve the problem. History reveals many misuses of
public office that could have been prosecuted under then-existing
law, but the incidence of prosecution is rare.48
Although the isolation of particular factors is difficult,49 and formulation of a predictive test impossible, one may identify the general
considerations that deter criminal prosecution. First, political pressures may prevent prosecution if sensitive issues or prominent personalities are involved in the case.50 The pressure may come from
48. See ABCNY, supra note 22, at 117. There were several possible violations of
federal conflict of interest statutes committed by Adolphe H. Wenzell, then vicepresident of the First Boston Corporation and a part-time government consultant. in
the transactions surrounding the 1954 Yates-Dixon contract, but no criminal prosecutions were initiated. See United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364
U.S. 520 (1961). See also ABCNY, supra, at 163; R. GEI'Z, supra note 22, at 15-16; STAFF
R.EPOIIT, supra note 22. at 5.
Most prosecutions that have occurred have been for violations of the bribery statutes.
"Between July 1, 1942, and June 30, 1952, the Department of Justice brought only
eleven prosecutions of matters involving possible violations of conflict of interest laws,
and most of these dealt with alleged violations of the bribery statutes." ABCNY, supra,
at 73 n.l, citing Hearings on H. Res. 95 Before the Special Subcomm. To Investigate
the Department of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 20, pt. 2, at 982 (1952) [hereinafter Department of Justice Hearings]. See also id. at
117. Prior to 1963 one reason for the lack of prosecutions could have been the vagueness of the statutes. The pre-1963 statutes have been described as "a multiplication of
complexities and uncertainties," Wheeler, Restrictions on Activities of Personnel During and After Government Service, 6 FED. B.J. 333, 353 (1945), as containing "overlapping, inconsistent, and incomplete provisions, which not only differ among themselves
with respect to the classes of persons covered but are also subject to numerous general
and special exemptions," STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 2 (footnotes deleted), and as
" ••• archaic, inconsistent, overlapping, [and] ineffective to achieve their purpose ••••"
B. MANNING, supra note 34, at 5.
49. Decisions to decline, dismiss, negotiate, or compromise a case are rarely committed to writing. See Rabin, supra note 43, at 1042.
50. See id. at 1066-67. Cf. H. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, !MPAcr AND PROSECUTION OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 42 (1970). Prosecution of the government employee may lead to
demands that the third party be prosecuted as well. Political pressure may be used to
prevent a prosecution that may have what are perceived as undesirable or unpredictable repercussions.
Recently many examples of alleged failures to investigate or prosecute due to the
political influence of the alleged violators have been reported. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 10, 1973, at 37 (alleged White House pressure to prevent investigation of financier
Robert Vesco's connection with a drug smuggling operation). See also materials cited
note 43 supra. But see Department of Justice Hearings, supra note 48, at 983: "The
Attorney General told me also to tell this committee that he ••• [intends] to prosecute
when there has been a violation, and he said that he intends, when any cases are brought
to his attention, to proceed immediately with grand juries in connection with them."
See also ABCNY, supra note 22, at 163. The vigor with which such declarations are
followed, especially in sensitive cases, is questionable when one considers that the
Attorney General, his immediate subordinates, and United States attorneys are political
appointees.
There may, of course, also be political pressure in the opposite direction. The opposition party seeks to expose conflicts of interest within the administration in order to
embarrass it. ABCNY, supra, at 163. This may result in some pressure to prosecute,
but partisan cries subside once the alleged malefactor leaves his position and maximum
political advantage has been gained.
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superiors, as the result of high-level intra-agency conferences, or from
other sources.51
Second, numerous internal pressures within the prosecutor's
office, some completely unrelated to the merits of the controversy,
may play a decisive role. The availability of economic and physical
resources, the caseload demand, 52 and the difficulty of proving guiWi8
may be determining factors. Conflict of interest cases are often complex;5~ proof of intent may depend upon the interpretation of ambiguous conversations and written documents and may require many
witnesses. Proof of more common crimes, such as armed robbery, is
more simple and usually involves less ambiguous facts. Furthermore,
the complexity of the case may make it relatively time consuming.
The prosecutor thus must select between probably successful prosecutions of a number of "ordinary" criminal cases and devotion of substantial manpower to one conflict of interest case, with perhaps
marginal chances of success.55 Other sanctions already imposed upon
the alleged culprit, such as job dismissal or demotion, may add to the
disincentives to prosecute.56
Still other pressures, reflected in the attitudes of judges and jurors,
may · discourage prosecutions. Despite general public indignation
against dishonesty and undue influence in government, it is questionable whether judges, juries, or the public, for that matter, really
believe that the less flagrant conflict of interest violations deserve
criminal sanctions.57 Jurors may be unwilling to convict government
51. See H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 50, at 42.
52. See Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the Criminal Sanction in Fraud and Corruption Cases: Losing the Battle Against White-Collar Crime, 11 AM, CRIM. L. REv. 959,
960 (1973); Rabin, supra note 43, at 1044-45.
53. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 5. See also Rabin, supra note 43, at 1062,
Cf. H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 50, at 42-43, 45-53.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961);
Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13 (1927); Pan Am. Petroleum &: Transp.
Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456 (1927). Cf. H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 50, at 42-43,
45-53; Rabin, supra note 43, at 1047-52, 1062 (substantial number of potential securities
and mail fraud cases not prosecuted because of complex nature of cases and substantial
resources required).
55. One author concludes, on the basis of extensive empirical study, that conviction
rate is the principal criterion by which the effectiveness of a United States attorney's
office is judged. A tendency thus exists to initiate prosecutions only in cases in which
there is a strong possibility that the defendant will be convicted or plead guilty.
Rabin, supra note 43, at 1045, 1047, 1062, 1071. Cf. D. STANLEY &: M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTGY
154-55 (1971) (inaction of United States attorneys on criminal bankruptcy complaints
attributable in part to pressures of higher priority or more attractive cases).
56. See Rabin, supra note 43, at 1059-61. A jury's willingness to convict may also
be influenced by the extent to which administrative or nonlegal sanctions have already
been imposed. See H. KAI.VEN &: H. ZEISEL, THE A.MEruCAN JURY 304-05 (1966).
57. There is some evidence that juries are relatively sympathetic toward white-collar
criminals. A 1953 study of the public's evaluation of penalties imposed for certain
violations of the Pure Food and Drug Act revealed dissatisfaction with administrative
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employees or third parties of felonies when, as in many cases, the
injury to the public is not immediately identifiable.58 Prosecutors
may view indictments as futile in light of such attitudes.59 Even when
convictions are obtained, light sentences are often imposed,60 a factor
that may also deter prosecution. Finally, judges faced with calendars crowded with what they deem to be more important cases may
exert overt or subtle pressures on prosecutors to ignore the less politically volatile cases.61
Of course, prosecutions may not occur because the interest in
holding the wrongdoer accountable may be outweighed by other
valid concerns. Conflict of interest cases often present a delicate
balance benveen the desire to prevent employee misconduct and the
governmental need adequately to staff programs and positions with
citizens drawn on a temporary basis from private life.62 The Justice
Department may forgo prosecution of some apparent violations of
the conflict of interest laws in order not to frustrate government
recruiting operations by causing private individuals to fear criminal
prosecution for making inadvertent or minor missteps in a proffered
public position. 63
penalties and the sentiment that some jail penalties were appropriate. The majority of
respondents, however, would not have imposed severe jail sentences. Even blatant violations of the Act were viewed as comparable only to serious traffic offenses. Violators
were perceived not as criminals but as "lawbreakers." Newman, Public Attitudes
Toward a Form of White-Collar Crime, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL 287-93 (G. Geis ed.
1968). See also H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 50, at 42-43, 59; note 64 supra. But see
Changing Morality, T.u.m, June 6, 1969, at 26.
.
Another assessment of public attitudes about white-collar crime reaches the same
conclusion. Clinard, Corruption Runs Far Deeper Than Politics, in CRIME AND CRll\1INAL JumCE 38-45 (D. Cressey ed. 1971). As bank robber Willie Sutton supposedly observed: "Judy Coplon is free to go as she pleases. Others, accused of defrauding the
Government of hundreds of thousands of dollars, merely get a letter from a committee
in Washington asking them to come in and talk it over. Maybe it's justice, but it's
puzzling to a guy like me." Id. at 43.
58. See Rabin, supra note 43, at 1055. But see H. EDEI.HERTZ, supra note 50, at
52 n.8.
59. See Rabin, supra note 43, at 1053-56. Cf. H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 50, at 43, 59.
60. See Ogren, supra note 52, at 962-64; Seymour, Social and Ethical Considerations
in Assessing White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 821, 822, 828 (1973).
61. See Rabin, supra note 43, at 1045, 1047, 1053-56, 1071.
62. STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 2, states: "In periods of national stress
[Congress) has tended to carve out exceptions and exemptions from the conflict of
interest statutes, in apparent response to the thesis that to insist upon strict ac•
countability between a citizen and his employer-Government might deter the able
from accepting public office and thus impair the national effort." See also ABCNY,
supra note 22, at 152-64; B. MANNING, supra note 34, at 5-7; STAFF REPORT, supra, at
3-4; McElwain 8c Vorenberg, The Federal Conflict of Interest Statutes, 65 HARv. L. REv.
955-56 (1952); Wheeler, supra note 48, at 353.
63. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, in its report on the pre1963 conflict of interest laws, states:
At many critical points [the statutes] defy understanding or prediction • • • •
Conviction, prosecution followed by acquittal, or even indictment under one of
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The limited scope of current statutes may also influence the incidence of prosecutions. The laws are directed primarily at the government employee, and not at the third party who may have abetted the
breach of duty. 64 Judges, jurors, and prosecutors may be reluctant
to convict a government employee while the third-party beneficiary
goes free. 65
Enforcement of new legislation making criminal the disclosure
and receipt of any confidential government information would be
subject to many of the pressures that hinder the enforcement of
existing sanctions. Offenses would continue to be difficult to prove
and there is no reason to suspect that internal and political pressures
against prosecution would dissipate. Principal enforcement of the
fiduciary duties of government employees may be better left to
mechanisms other than the criminal process.
3. Administrative Controls
Administrative controls are another weapon in the government's
arsenal. Prior to 1965 there was little agency 66 supervision of the
.fiduciary duties of employees. Some agencies promulgated regulations that were enforced in varying degrees while others undertook
neither regulations nor enforcement e.fforts.67 In 1965 an attempt was
made to unify agency positions and to promote a policy of vigorous
enforcement. An Executive Order directed the United States Civil
Service Commission to formulate comprehensive regulations governing the conduct of federal employees.68 The resulting Civil Service
these statutes can disgrace a man for life. And so when the prospective aprointee
asks his lawyer for counsel on the application of the conDicts statutes to his par•
ticular situation, the careful lawyer tends to be especially cautious. The more strict
the lawyer's intei:pretation, the more likely that the appointee will decide that the
personal costs of compliance with the statutes are too great and that he had better
decline the appointment.
ABCNY, supra note 22, at 163.
64. Criminal conspiracy charges could perhaps be brought against the third-party
recipient of the confidential government information. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 286, 371
(1970).
65. There may be a tendency on the part of juries to acquit defendants who have
either played a minor role or have received no direct monetary benefit from the transaction. When the principal criminal actor is not prosecuted, juries may acquit the
remaining defendant in the belief that he has been "left holding the bag." An example
is the acquittal in a bribery trial of an employee who accepts a bribe, but who receives
no monetary benefit and acts only on behalf of a superior. H. KALVEN &: H. ZEISEL,
supra note 56, at 317.
66. "Agency" as used in this section includes any executive department, independent
federal office, or government coi:poration.
67. See ABCNY, supra note 22, at 79-94, 149; B. MANNING, supra note 34, at 272;
STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
68. Exec. Order No. 11,222 §§ 70l(a)•(b), 3 C.F.R. 160 (1973).
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orders expressly prohibit both the use of confidential information by
government employees for personal gain and the advance disclosure
of such information to outsiders.69 All agencies were ordered to
supplement Commission rules ·with appropriate regulations of their
own.70 Each agency now identifies classes of information falling within the prohibitions.71
Enforcement of these comprehensive regulations would offer advantages over criminal prosecution. Administrative action can reach
conduct that, although a breach of fiduciary duty, does not constitute
a crime or warrant criminal punishment. Agencies can also improvise
methods of dealing with their particular conflict of interest problems
with a flexibility not possible in a more general criminal code. Also,
a change in agency activities may create different conflict of interest
problems, and regulations may be easily updated to meet new situations. Finally, the administrative process offers a more flexible choice of sanctions than the criminal process. Discipline may range
from an oral reprimand to the employee's dismissal.72
Unfortunately, these advantages may be more apparent than real.
The deterrent effect of the regulations depends on vigorous agency
enforcement, and evidence that a new enforcement attitude has accompanied the new regulations is inconclusive. On the one hand, an
agency's desire to protect itself from embarrassment and from outside
investigations may be a strong incentive for internal enforcement.78
On the other hand, agency exposure of employee misconduct may
invite adverse publicity and congressional inquiry that agency officials wish to avoid, and therefore lead them to the conclusion that
formal action is not in the agency's best interest.
Furthermore, agencies are subject to the same internal and external pressures as other organizations.74 Organizational politics may
play a role in enforcement decisions.75 A superior may not report ap69. See 5 C.F.R. § 735.206 (1973). See also 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.20la(a), .203, .303 (1973);
Exec. Order No. 11..222 § 205, 3 C.F.R. 161 (1973). See generally 5 C.F.R. § 735.201-.210
(1973).
70. See Exec. Order 11,222 § 602, 3 C.F.R. 164 (1973).
71. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 1001.735-205 (1973) (Civil Service Commission); '7 C.F.R.
§ 0.735-20 (1973) (Office of Secretary of Agriculture}; 22 C.F.R. §§ 10.735-208, -303
(1973) (Department of State).
72. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.101-.402 (1973); ABCNY, supra note 22, at 149-50; STAFF
REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
73. Any uncorrected employee misconduct is a ready target for the news media and
the Congress. See ABCNY, supra note 22, at 163. But see text accompanying note 78
infra.
74. Cf., e.g., GUETZKOW, Communications in Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZA·
noNs, supra note 27, at 534; Peabody&: Rourke, supra note 29, at 802.
75. Subordinates may withhold information that threatens their position. See gen·
erally Guetzkow, supra note 74, at 555.
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parent violations by employees in the fear that the illegal activity may
adversely reflect on his ovm supervisory role or that investigation
may implicate others more highly placed.76 Also, agencies are frequently criticized for becoming too subservient to the industries and
producer groups they supposedly regulate. 77 Where such an environment exists agency personnel may regard some leaks of confidential
information to selected members of an industry or producer groups
as unobjectionable.78
For still other reasons it seems naive to place heavy reliance upon
the administrative process. Many government employees serve on
only a part-time or temporary basis.79 The threat of administrative
sanctions may be less significant to such employees and have less of a
deterrent effect on them than it would have on permanent employees.80
Even if the regulations were strenuously enforced, they are aimed
at the employee and do not reach the outsider. Normally, however,
it is the outsider who has the "deep pocket," and thus administrative
action, unless supplemented by other remedial devices, cannot recover government losses or recoup unjust profits.81

Conclusion
The principles governing :fiduciary relationships adequately define the government employee's duties and the consequences of any
interference with or breach of those duties. No substantive changes
in these principles are necessary. Current procedures, however, are
unable to guarantee enforcement of fiduciary duties or protection of
confidential information. The enforcement mechanisms are in the
control of those who, for a variety of reasons, may have an interest in
their nonuse. What is needed is a mechanism, less subject to political
76. See, e.g., M. M1NTz & J. COHEN, .AMERICA, INC. 237-53 (1971).
D.

77. See note 3 supra.
78. Cf. L PETER &: R. HULL, THE P.ETER PRINCIPLE 36-38 (1969); Guetzkow, supra note
74, at 555.
79. The federal government increasingly uses temporary employees as consultants
and experts. See ABCNY, supra note 22, at 145-48, 161-62, 196. They assist agency personnel on matters of policy as well as on technical and scientific matters. Id. at 146,
For an example of an intermittent employee improperly using confidential information
see United States v. Miss.issippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
80. Temporary employees who maintain their ties with previous employers while
doing work for the government may also have the incentive and the opportunity to
leak information to those businesses with which they are associated. See United States
v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
81. Even if agency procedures could be used to cancel contracts with or otherwise
sanction the outsider, the agency may not take such action for the same reasons that
civil and criminal actions are not commenced. See notes 43, 50 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Ariz. Republic, July 5, 1970, at A-18, col 1.
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or internal pressures, that can be used both to protect the public
interest and, perhaps, to stimulate government agencies and officials
whose responsibility is to enforce the fiduciary duties owed to the
government.

II.

A PROPOSED CITIZENS' ACTION

Introduction
The balance of this Article discusses a proposal for a new citizens'
action to augment the government's civil, criminal, and administrative remedies. The citizens' action would be (1) a representative
action (2) brought on behalf of the federal government and the
public82 (3) by a qualified citizen or group of citizens (4) alleging
that a third party (5) has been improperly made privy (6) to confidential government information and (7) has used it for personal
economic profit (8) with knowledge of its confidential nature. Any
recovery obtained by means of a citizens' action would accrue to the
government; the plaintiff would receive reasonable attorney's fees
and litigation costs.83
The citizens' action proposal is not intended to authorize any private citizen to sue any government employee or third party for all
misuses of government position or power. Rather, the action is advocated as an independent, supplemental enforcement device by which
qualified unofficial representatives of the public, in a manner conA.

82. The United States, like the corporation in a shareholder derivative suit, would
be the real party in interest. See 7A c. WRIGHT 8c A. Mn.I.ER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1822 (1972).
83. A potential award of attorney's fees and litigation costs would serve as an incentive to bring a citizens' action, cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), reud. on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971) ("prospect of handsome compensation is held out as an inducement to encourage lawyers to bring such suits'?, and
to conduct the litigation as a public representative, cf. Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), thereby promoting the congressional purpose and the public interest.
See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13 (1973); Hamburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest
in the United States of America, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 343, 348, 373-75 (1974). Congress
has authorized the award of fees and costs in the somewhat analogous qui tam action,
created by the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-35 (1970). The Act provides
that
the court may award to the person who brought such suit and prosecuted it to
final judgment, or to settlement, • • • out of the proceeds of such suit or any
settlement of any claim involved therein, which shall be collected, an amount, not
in excess of one-fourth of the proceeds of such suit or any settlement thereof,
which in the judgment of the court is fair and reasonable compensation to such
person for the collection of any forfeiture and damages; and such person shall be
entitled to receive to his own use such reasonable expenses as the court shall find
to have been necessarily incurred and all costs the court may award against the
defendant, to be allowed and taxed according to any provision of law or rule of
court in force, or that shall be in force in suits between private parties in said
court: Provided, That such person shall be liable for all costs incurred by himself
in such case and shall have no claim therefor on the United States.
31 U.S.C. 232(E)(2) (1970). See note 95 infra.
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sistent with constitutional imperatives, may bring suit when confidential government information has been misused by third persons
for their personal benefit. The action is independent in that its
prosecution will not be controlled by any political branch of the
government; it is supplemental in that it is designed to prevent and
correct the adverse social and economic consequences of misuse of
information when the primary enforcement devices fail. Thus, a
plaintiff would not be able to commence the action at his whim, but
only if no action by the government has been taken84 and a written
request asking the Justice Department to institute action has been
filed and refused or ignored.85
Insofar as the citizens' action is a representative action, it shares
84. The citizens' action, unlike the private antitrust suit, should not be allowed
to proceed simultaneously with a government civil action. Because the citizen sues on
behalf of the government the appropriate analogy is to the shareholder derivative suit,
which under federal law is allowed only where the corporation has refused to assert
its rights. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 23.1. Thus, where the government objects to a citizens'
action on the ground that it is going to file its own action, the appropriate procedure
would be to stay the citizens' action. The plaintiff would have the right to request that
the stay be lifted if the government fails to file suit or if it files suit but fails to prose•
cute vigorously.
A problem may arise where the government files suit before the initiation of a
citizens' action but settles the case for an insubstantial sum, or dismisses the case with
prejudice. The very act of filing suit, motivated by the threat of a citizens' action,
would be an improvement of present government practices, and once a suit is filed
the executive branch may not wish to influence the manner in which the case is
prosecuted, especially if the public interest is aroused. However, some safeguard should
exist against the filing of suit by the government without serious intent to prosecute
and solely for the purpose of foreclosing a future citizens' action. One solution would
be to require that any settlement or dismissal of a civil action brought by the govern•
ment to recoup its losses or to capture another's profits on the basis of unauthorized
disclosure or use of confidential government information be approved by the court,
and that there be a 60-day hiatus between the filing of the proposed settlement or dismissal and the court approval. During this time a citizen could object to the settlement
or dismissal on the ground that it contravenes the public interest and could request
that the action proceed as a citizens' action. A hearing would be held to determine
the validity of the objections. A citizen could similarly be allowed to intervene when
a government action has been filed but not actively prosecuted. Cf. Federal False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (private party may maintain an action if the government
fails to prosecute "with due diligence" within six months of its initial appearance).
The court could permit the initiation of a separate citizens' action, or, if the statute of
limitations has run, the government action could be converted into a citizens' action.
Cf. Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-35 (1970); FED. R. C1v. P. 17(a): 6
C. WRIGHT & A. Mll.LER, supra note 82, § 1555. A government showing of the reason•
ableness of its action would be entitled to great weight, and probably few settlements
or dismissals would not be approved. Nevertheless, the suggested procedure would at
least require the government to state publicly the reasons for its actions.
85. Cf. Federal False Claims Act, 81 U.5.C. §§ 231-85 (1970). See note 95 infra. Argu•
ably the citizens' action should not be preempted by criminal prosecution of the de•
fendants. The law contemplates parallel private enforcement in other areas despite the
potential interference with criminal investigations based upon the same underlying
facts. See notes 109-11 infra. Any potential interference could be mitigated by allowing
the Justice Department to intervene in citizens' actions against defendants who will be
the subject of criminal prosecution.
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some characteristics of a class action, a shareholder derivative suit,
and a qui tam action. It is designed to incorporate the strengths and
to avoid the theoretical and practical weaknesses of these procedures.
For instance, an attempt to enforce a government employee's fiduciary duties by means of a class action brought by a taxpayer on behalf of himself and other taxpayers would face several difficult
obstacles. First, it is not clear whether the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information by a government employee_ would be a
breach of a duty owed directly to individual citizens.86 Assuming that
it would be, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Eisen v.
Carlisle &- Jacquelin 87 appears to require that individual notice be
given to all affected citizens who can be identified by reasonable
efforts.BB The cost of fulfilling this requirement would probably make
a class action infeasible.89 Furthermore, there are many situations in
which the employee's disclosure of confidential information would
not result in immediate economic injury to the United States treasury.00 Without a recognizable injury to citizen taxpayers a class
action could not be maintained.91 Finally, even if damages were recoverable, their distribution to the injured class would be a problem
unless a fluid class theory were accepted.92 The proposed citizens'
action does not suffer from any of these difficulties.
86. See note 44 supra.
87. 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974).
88. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4809.
89. Whether the Supreme Court would accept notice by publication in the context
of a broadly based class action is uncertain. The answer depends upon how much effort
must be made to ascertain the names and addresses of the individual members of the
class. See Eisen v. Carlisle 8: Jacquelin, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804, 4809-10 (U.S. May 28, 1974).
In Eisen the Court stated that individual notice by ordinary mail had to be given to
2,250,000 identifiable members of the class, which would have cost approximately
315,000 dollars at current first-class postage rates. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4807 n.7.
90. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
91. But see note 44 supra.
92. The fluid class idea was proposed by the United States District Court in Eisen v.
Carlisle &: Jacqueline, 52 F.R.D. 253, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), but was rejected by the
Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacqueline, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974). The
plaintiff in Eisen was suing for himself and on behalf of 2,250,000 others similarly
situated. The Supreme Court explained the district court's proposal as a
"fluid class" recovery whereby damages would be distributed to future odd-lot
traders rather than to the specific class members who were actually injured. The
fdistrict] court suggested that "a fund equivalent to the amount of unclaimed
damages might be established and the odd-lot differential reduced in an amount
determined reasonable by the court until such time as the fund is depleted." 52
F.R.D., at 265. The need to resort to this expedient of recovery by the "next best
class" arose from the prohibitively high cost of computing and awarding multitudinous small damage claims on an individual basis.
42 U.S.L.W. at 4807. The fluid class theory as applied to class actions based on disclosures of confidential information could in theory result in a general reduction of
taxes pursuant to payment of the recovery to the United States treasury, but the
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The citizens' action is similar to the shareholder derivative suit
in that the plaintiff would not sue to recover for an injury to his
personal interests; the suit would be on behalf of the government.
This raises a standing issue. Citizens generally lack standing to litigate on behalf of the United States because federal law places the
exclusive power to conduct litigation in which the United States has
an interest in the Department of Justice, except where Congress
provides otherwise. 93 The citizens' action would thus require authorizing legislation.94
Precedent for such legislation may be found in federal qui tam
statutes, which, for instance, permit one private citizen to sue another
benefit to an individual taxpayer, even in cases involving millions of dollars, would be
negligible.
93. Congress apparently has the authority to designate anyone to act as the legal
representative of the United States in any case in which the government has an interest.
Article IV, section 3, clause 2, of the Constitution grants to Congress the exclusive
"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and other Property belonging to the United States." In United States v. California,
332 U.S. 18, 26-29 (1947), the Court recognized that Congress could limit the Attorney
General's authority to pursue claims of the United States. Although the cases that dis•
cuss article IV, section 3, clause 2, have usually involved land or other physical prop•
erty, e.g., United States v. City 8: County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30 (1940),
it may be assumed that "Property" as used in that clause includes intangible property,
such as an enforceable legal right, as well. Article IV, section 3, clause 2, is apparently
the constitutional basis for qui tam statutes, which allow a private citizen to sue on
behalf of the United States in certain circumstances. E.g., Federal False Claims Act,
31 U.S.C. §§ 231-35 (1970). See note 95 infra. Although the present qui tam statutes
allow intervention by the Attorney General or the Department of Justice, 31 U.S.C.
§ 232 (1970), an earlier version placed exclusive control of the litigation in the hands
of the private plaintiffs. See Bush v. United States, 13 F. 625, 629 (C.C. Ore. 1882).
Congress has implicitly recognized its ability to empower citizens to sue as the rep•
resentative of the United States in 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970), which provides: "Except as
otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an
agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is
reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney
General" (emphasis added). See also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 31'7 U.S. 537
(1943); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv, 633 (1971); Jaffe, Standing To Secure
Judicial Review: Public Actions, '14 HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1961); Jaffe, The Citizen as
Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 166 U, PA.
L. REv. 1033 (1968); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court: A Functional Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REv. 645, 657 (1973).
Once Congress has vested the citizen with the power to sue as the representative of
the United States the standing of the representative depends only upon whether the
represented party-the real party in interest-has the "requisite personal stake in the
outcome of the litigation" that is being prosecuted on his behalf. See, e.g., Workmen's
Compensation Exch. v. Chicago, M., St. P. 8: P. R.R., 45 F,2d 885 (D. Idaho 1930);
McFerren v. First Natl. Bank, 214 Iowa 198, 238 N.W. 914 (1931). The rights of the
United States-the represented party in the proposed citizens' action-would certainly
be sufficient to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement.
94. The statutory grant of authority would distinguish the citizens' action from
the situation in which all citizens share an undifferentiated interest in the case. See
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 42 U.S.L.W. 5088 (U.S. June 25,
1974} (respondents, suing as representatives of all United States citizens, denied standing).
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pursuant to a statute that establishes a fine, penalty, or forfeiture for
fraudulent claims for or misuse of federal funds and allows the successful private litigant to retain a portion of the penalty, with the
government receiving the balance.95 The qui tam statutes were instituted to augment inadequately staffed enforcement agencies; they
became unnecessary as official law enforcement bodies grew and unpopular as the prospect of large recoveries led to significant abuses.96
The proposed citizens' action would avoid the latter difficulty by
limiting the plaintiff's recovery to reasonable attorney's fees and
litigation costs. Damages would accrue to the government. Furthermore, maintenance of the citizens' action would depend on the quality of the purported representation and the reasons for nonprosecution
by the government, matters closely linked to possibility of abuse and
not dealt with in the traditional qui tam action.
95. Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-35 (1970). Some qui tam statutes allow
informers to recover after successful government prosecution, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 201
(1970), and others allow private individuals to prosecute. E.g., Federal False Claims
Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-35 (1970); 46 U.S.C. §§ 351-54 (1970). An example of the modem
qui tam action is 31 U.S.C. § 232(C), which provides:
Whenever any ••• suit [seeking to enforce a penalty from one who has made
fraudulent claims against the United States] shall be brought by any person under
clause (B) of this section notice of the pendency of such suit shall be given to
the United States by serving upon the United States attorney for the district
in which such suit shall have been brought a copy of the bill of complaint and by
sending, by registered mail, or by certified mail, to the Attorney General of the
United States at Washington, District of Columbia, a copy of such bill together
with a disclosure in writing of substantially all evidence and information in his
possession material to the effective prosecution of such suit. The United States
shall have sixty days, after service as above provided, within which to enter
appearance in such suit. If the United States shall fail, or decline in writing to
the court, during said period of sixty days to enter any such suit, such person
may carry on such suit. If the United States within said period shall enter appearance in such suit the same shall be carried on solely by the United States. In
carrying on such suit the United States shall not be bound by any action taken
by the person who brought it, and may proceed in all respects as if it were
instituting the suit: Provided, That if the United States shall fail to carry on such
suit with due diligence within a period of six months from the date of its appearance therein, or within such additional time as the court after notice may
allow, such suit may be carried on by the person bringing the same in accordance
with clause (B) of this section.
For explanation of the history and operation of qui tam statutes see Comment,
Qui Tam Suits Under the Federal False Claims Act: Tool of the Private Litigant in
Public Actions, 67 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 446 (1972); Comment, Qui Tam Actions: The Role of
the Private Citizen in Law Enforcement, 20 UCLA L. R.Ev. 778 (1973).
96. Although the relevant legislative material is somewhat sparse, the congressional debates suggest that there were two reasons for decreasing the qui tam
plaintiff's share of the recovery. First, the potential rewards from bringing qui
tam suits under the False Claims Act were so great that underworld figures
apparently were enticed to file actions. The Chairman of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary stated that "today [the qui tam proceeding under the False
Claims Act] has become one of the worst sources of racketeering since the days
of Al Capone in the prohibition era." • • • Second, it was noted that, of the
qui tam actions then pending, each case involved a potential recovery of between
$100,000 and $40,000,000. It was believed that a reduction in the qui tam plaintiff's
share of the award would not work a hardship if the action were a bona fide
attempt to assist the government in enforcing the law.
Comment, 67 Nw. U. L R.Ev. 446, supra note 95, at 457 n. 54. See -also id. at 451 n.21.
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Controlling the Citizens' Action: The Evidentiary Hearing

A statute allowing private suits involving government officials
is uniquely susceptible to abuse. Questionable suits could be filed,
either to induce large out-of-court settlements or to harass government officials. Members of political parties not in power could allege
misuse of information in order to embarrass the opposition. Such
dangers may be forestalled by applying procedural safeguards developed in other settings. The first stage of the judicial proceedings
could thus be an inquiry, patterned after the evidentiary hearings
used under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 and 23.l in connection with class actions and shareholder derivative suits, that would
determine whether and under what conditions the citizens' action
would be allowed to proceed.
1. Phase One-Determining the Proper Parties
a. Government objection to suit by a private plaintiff. Because
the private citizen is not the duly authorized representative of the
public interest, private suits should not be allowed unless it can be
shown that they will not frustrate valid government political or operational concerns. Government inaction, or, analogously, government objection to the maintenance of a citizens' action, might be
presumed to reflect important public interests that are neither perceived nor adequately represented by the citizens' action plaintiff.
The most sensitive objection would be an assertion that a particular citizens' action is not in the national interest. Conceivably
the prosecution of a legitimate government claim, although promoting the public interest in honest and efficient government, might require the disclosure of confidential information or conflict with the
fulfillment of another national policy objective. One may argue that
the Constitution delegates the primary responsibility for choosing
among conflicting policies to the executive branch, which is more
representative, politically responsive, and informed than the individual citizen.91 Arguably, a particular citizens' action might interfere
with the functioning of the executive branch and involve courts in
an area that is not entrusted to their judgment. I£ a citizen has a
97. For a discussion of similar arguments in the area of administrative law see
Jaffe, 84 HARv. L. R.Ev. 633, supra note 93, at 637-38. With respect to shareholder
derivative suits see Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1957). Allowing a
citizen to press a claim that would normally be prosecuted by a public official is not
without precedent. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 775.12 (1968) (private prosecu•
tion of criminal charge allowed if bond posted after prosecutor refuses to prosecute).
See also note 95 supra.
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grievance concerning the management of the government, the argument proceeds, his redress is through the ballot box rather than
through court action.98
This last point deserves primary attention. The conclusion that
the citizens' role in deterring misuse of information should be limited to the electoral process is hardly realistic. Questions of the integrity of subordinate executive officials or employees usually do not
determine the outcome of national elections.99 The proposed action
provides a more convenient and realistic means for citizens to exercise on a day-to-day basis their role as the ultimate check in a government predicated upon checks and balances. Instead of leaving citizens
with the impression that important concerns will be lost in the immediacy of the election process, or with a feeling of helplessness or
exclusion from the operation of their govemment,100 the citizens'
action provides a vehicle for effective citizen participation in correcting breaches of fiduciary duty and in promoting responsible and
honest government.
Nevertheless, one may contend that citizens should not be allowed
to usurp functions -intended to be delegated to the executive branch.
This argument has merit if one is willing to make the dubious assumption that government actions are always the consequence of
reasoned judgment and are never the result of improper motives
inconsistent with the reasons for placing the primary decisional power
in the executive branch. Because these assumptions are not always
true101 the real question is not whether citizens, acting through the
courts, should be allowed to second-guess the executive branch as to
what is in the national interest. Rather, a government objection to
the maintenance of a civil action should be evaluated in terms of
whether the executive action is in fact predicated upon a choice be· 98. See Jaffe, 116 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1033, supra note 93, at 1036.
99. See, e.g., Harris, Nixon Maintains Wide Lead in Final Poll (Hanis Survey, Nov.
6, 1972); Harris, I.T.T. Case-Kleindienst Appointment (Harris Survey, May 1, 1972).
See also Jaffe, 116 U. PA. L REv. 1033, supra note 93, at 1036, 1038. Such issues tend
to be obscured by more pressing questions of foreign policy, domestic economic problems, and defense. See V. KEY, THE REsl'ONSIBLE ELECIORATE 130-31 (1966).
100. See Jaffe, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, supra note 93, at 1044-45.
101. See, e.g., note 50 supra and text accompanying notes 43, 50-51 supra. One
commentator has noted that there exists a "presupposition ••• that public parties need
not be allowed to litigate the public interest since the administrators themselves are the
representatives and protectors of the public interest. One possible explanation for the
shift in the law [away from this presupposition] is the skepticism on the part of the
public and the courts that the administrators adequately fulfill such roles on behalf
of the public" (footnotes omitted). Note, Citizen Organizations Intervening in Federal
Administrative Proceedings: The Lingering Issue of Standing, 51 B.U. L. REv. 403, 407
(1971). See also Hamburger, supra note 83, at 376.
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tween conflicting national interests. If it is not, and if one assumes
that nonprosecution should not be tolerated in these circumstances,
the intervention of private parties should be allowed. Resolution of
this more narrow issue is not an unwarranted intrusion upon executive power. On the contrary, it would be consistent with the wellrecognized function of the courts as a check upon the misuse of
executive power.102
The citizens' action should not be quashed simply because the
government's national interest objection may be based on national
security or on the need to protect confidential information. 103 In this
situation the court could order an in camera hearing at which it
would determine the validity of the objection.104 The government
would have to show that national security would be undermined by
the maintenance of the citizens' action and that the confidentiality
of sensitive information could not be adequately protected by ap•
propriate discovery orders and rulings on objections at trial. 101i If the
102. See United States v. Nixon, 42 U.SL.W. 523'7 (U.S. July 24, 19'74); Youngstown
Sheet 8: Tube Co. v•. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803); In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.), modified, 48'7 F,2d 700
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Jaffe, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, supra note 93, at 1044-45; Comment, In
Camera Inspections Under the Freedom of Information Act, 41 U. CHI, L. REV. 55'7
(1974). But cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (19'72) (not role of the judiciary con•
tinuously to monitor the wisdom of executive action). Even assuming that the govern•
ment's determination of what comprises the national interest receives maximum
deference, the airing of its reasoning in open court will provide citizens with informa•
tion necessary to evaluate the efficiency of the executive branch.
103. A civil lawsuit based upon the unauthorized use of confidential government
information for private profit would rarely involve continuing national security, even
in sensitive cases. The fact that the plaintiff was able to acquire sufficient information
to file a complaint may indicate that security is no longer possible.
104. Cf. Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitchell, 63 F.R.D. 125, 126-27 (E.D. Pa, 1972).
105. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). See also B C. WRIGHT 8: A. MILLER, supra note 82,
§ 2035.
The government could claim that even an in camera hearing would be inap•
propriate, and that its assertions concerning national security must be accepted at face
value. Recent cases dealing with the analogous subject of executive privilege indicate
that such an argument would not succeed. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 48'7 F.2d 700 (D.C.
Cir. 1973):
We of course acknowledge the longstanding judicial recognition of Executive
privilege. Courts have appreciated that the public interest in maintaining the
secrecy of military and diplomatic plans may override private interests in litigation. They have further responded to Executive pleas to protect from the light
of litigation "intra-governmental documents reflecting • • • deliberations com•
prising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated." In so doing, the Judiciary has been sensitive to the considerations
upon which the President seems to rest his claim of absolute privilege: the
candor of Executive aides and functionaries would be impaired if they were
persistently worried that their advice and deliberations were later to be made
public. However, counsel for the President can point to no case in which a court
has accepted the Executive's mere assertion of privilege as sufficient to overcome
the need of the party subpoenaing the documents. To the contrary, the courts
have repeatedly asserted that the applicability of the privilege is in the end for
them and not the Executive to decide. They have, moreover, frequently ordered
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government is unable to show that the suit is not in the national
interest or that it would compromise national security, the citizens'
action should be permitted to proceed to the next phase.106
The government's failure to prosecute may also be based on valid
operational concerns. In deciding whether to pursue a case the government may legitimately weigh the possibility of a favorable outcome, the value of the relief sought, the precedential importance of
the case, the national interest involved, and the court's possible response to the facts of the case as opposed to its response to the facts
of another case involving the same issue,107 a consideration important
if the government is attempting to create a uniform trend of decision.
A government objection to the maintenance of a citizens' action
arguing that the government's decision not to proceed was legitimately based on these or similar concerns and that the decision should
not be "second-guessed" by a citizens' action plaintiff should, however, be overruled. The private plaintiff's funds will be used to investigate and prosecute the claim, producing little if any drain on
government prosecutorial resources.108 Concern over the proper allocation of legal resources is thus largely irrelevant in the citizens'
action context. Only the government's interest in developing uniform
case law merits attention, and this interest is insubstantial when
measured against the potential benefits of allowing citizens' actions.
Our legal enforcement system contemplates private prosecution of
claims in many situations in which government prosecution is possible. Thus, private suits are allowed in the areas of antitrust,109 securities,110 and environmental law,111 even though there is the danger
in camera inspection of documents for which a privilege was asserted in order to
determine the privilege's applicability.
487 F.2d at ?18-14, quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 818
(D.D.C. 1966), affd. sub. nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 884 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
106. See text accompanying notes 135-41 infra.
107. See also text accompanying notes 52-65 supra.108. Some government resources may be involved. Government attorneys monitor
the action, and may become actively involved if government information is sought
through discovery or pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
109. E.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 892 U.S. 184 (1968); Sherman
Antitrust Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
110. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 877 U.S. 426 (1964); Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp.
345 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
111. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 505, 88
U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. 1972); Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 12(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)
(1970); Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (Supp. 1972); Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 § 2(1), MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202 (Supp. 1974).
Both the Water Pollution Control and the Clean Air amendments contain provisions to coordinate private litigation with administrative enforcement. See Cramton 8c
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that uniform development of the law will suffer. The basic rationale,
applicable to the citizens' action as well as to private suits in other
areas, is that parallel private enforcement augments official actions,
which are limited by available resources, and that the combined
effort causes greater adherence to the law at the relatively low cost
of occasional deviations in the case law.112
q. Does the plaintiff fairly and adequately represent the interests
of other citizens? Assuming that the citizens' action survives a government objection based on political or operational concerns, the next
step would be to assess whether the particular plaintiff will fairly and
adequately represent the interests of other citizens.113 Here again,
existing representative actions, such as class actions and shareholder
derivative suits, provide useful models. Relevant factors would include the plaintiff's integrity,114 determination to prosecute the
claim,115 and ability to pursue the litigation.116 Evidence of a conflict
between the interests of the plaintiff and the interests of other citizens would disqualify him.117 Finally, the experience and qualifications of the plaintiff's attorney would be considered.118 The
:Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise?, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q.
407, 42.7 n.70 (1972). As in the proposed citizens' action, a plaintiff may sue under the
Clean Air Amendments only after notice to the proper governmental authorities fol•
lowed by government inaction or refusal to institute suit. Id.
112. Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. 13orak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); United States v. Baker•
Lockwood Mfg. Co., 138 F.2d 48, 52 (8th Cir. 1943), revd. on other grounds, 821 U.S.
746 (1944); Comment, 67 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 446, supra note 95, at 450-51 (discussing the
origins of qui tam actions). But cf. Cramton &: :Boyer, supra note 111, at 416-l'l (balkan•
ization of federal law exacerbated by courts' lack of guidance on substantive policies).
113. See generally 7 C. WRIGHT&: A. MILLER, supra note 82, §§ 1'765-69, 1789.
114. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
115. See, e.g., Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1968);
Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Epstein v. Weiss, !i0 F.R.D.
387,. 392 (E.D. La. 1970); Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 207 (D.D.C. 1969);
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. on other grounds, 438
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
116. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
The capacity of the plaintiff to bear the cost of litigation would seem to be a neces•
sary element of his ability to represent adequately the absentee members of the class.
Lack of financial resources has been a problem in the environmental area, and the
amount of litigation instituted by public interest organizations has consequently been
less than expected. See Cramton &: Boyer, supra note 111, at 417; Sax &: Conner, Michi•
gan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1003,
1080 (1972): note 141 infra. Such a requirement would eliminate the need for requiring
the plaintiff to put up a bond for costs, as is often required in shareholder derivative
suits. See, e.g., N.Y. :BANK. LAw § 6026 (McKinney 1971).
117. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Shulman
v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 207 (D.D.C. 1969).
118. See, e.g., Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir.
1968); Eisen v. Carlis1e & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, !i62 (2d Cir. 1968); Carpenter v.
Hall. an F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D• .!187, 392
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evaluation of th~ plaintiff and his counsel should be no more difficult
in the citizens' action than in class actions or shareholder derivative
suits. The body of law developed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 and 23.1 should provide courts ·with the necessary guidelines.119
The practical effect of the inquiry into adequacy of representation bears note. Although the proposal does not explicitly preclude
individuals from filing a citizens' action, as a practical matter the
average citizen will normally be foreclosed because of his inability
to establish that he can fairly and adequately represent the interests
of other citizens.120 The plaintiff will more likely be a community
leader or an organization that has demonstrated concern with the
proper administration of government.121 When the plaintiffs in class
actions are community leaders or organizations, courts have often
assumed that representation is adequate or have required less of a
showing of the representative capacity of the plaintiff.122 When more
than one group purports to represent the class, the court has the
power to choose the "best" representative to conduct the litigation.123
There is no reason why these ideas should not be carried over to the
citizens' action.
c. Proper defendants and possible exclusions. The potential defendants in a citizens' action are government employees and thirdparty recipients of confidential government information. A breach
of fiduciary duty by an employee is normally an ingredient of the
misuse of confidential information for private gain, and, under the
principles discussed in Part I of this Article, such a breach makes
the employee liable for the consequences.
(E.D. La. 1970); Schulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 207 (D.D.C. 1969); Dolgow v.
Andexson, 43 F.RJ). 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825
(2d Cir. 1971).
119. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. Mn.tER, supra note 82, §§ 1765-70, 1833. The ability
of the court to control the adequacy of the representation would not end with the
determination at the evidentiary hearing, but would continue throughout the action.
See generally id. § 1765.
120. Self-appointed representatives such as individual plaintiffs or ad hoc organizations have "no credentials to vouch for [their] degree of representativeness, and the
court can see this as making its judgment more difficult." Scott, supra note 93, at 681.
121. See, e.g., West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Co., 441 F.2d
232, 233-35 (4th Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608, 611, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also Association of
Data Processing Serv. Organization v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). But see note 116

supra.
122. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649, 651-52 (5th Cir. 1963) (community leader). Cf. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267, 269 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. Miu.ER, supra note 82, § 1765.
123. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX. LITIGATION (pt. 1) § 1.44 (West ed. 1973).
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It is not clear, however, that the technical culpability of the government employee should in fact subject him to liability in a citizens'
action. Many cases have granted to government employees an absolute or qualified immunity from private suit for actions taken in
their official capacity.124 The cases represent a judicial attempt to
balance the rights of the injured individual against the necessity that
a government employee not be unduly hampered in exercising his
duties.125 Fairness to the employee demands that he receive some
protection against liability for error in his exercise of discretion when
he has acted in good faith,126 and the employee should not be deterred
from executing his official responsibilities "with the decisiveness and
the judgment required by the public good.''127
A citizens' action directed at a government employee would not
conflict with these concerns. The fiduciary principle and the law governing the permissible uses of confidential government information
define an area in which we do not want the government employee to
have a choice of actions and, in fact, an area in which we wish to
restrict his discretion severely. Even when some discretion regarding
disclosure of confidential information is required, vigorous enforce•
ment of the fiduciary principle assures that that discretion will be
exercised with disinterested judgment and that it will not be influenced by factors such as personal financial interest.128
The opinions in cases granting immunity to government employees, however, also express the £ear that private actions may be
used to harass government employees and to disrupt government
operations.129 The citizens' action presents a similar potential for
abuse. A requirement that the plaintiff make a showing of substantial
likelihood of success on the merits130 would significantly reduce po124. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571, 574-75 (1959) (absolute immunity if
within the limits of employee's authority). See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 42 U.S.L.W.
4543, 4548 (U.S. April 17, 1974).
125. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 42 U.S.L.W. 4543, 4545-46 (IJ.S. April 17, 1974); Barr v,
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 565 (1959); Gamer v. Rathbum, 346 F.2d 55, 56 (10th Cir. 1965);
Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 131-33 (1st Cir. 1965).
126. In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959), the Supreme Court granted an
executive officer broad immunity against charges of libel. The Court has since articu•
lated a "good faith" requirement for state officials prosecuted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 42 U.S.L.W. 4543, 4548 (U.S. April 17, 1974) ("good faith
belief" a prerequisite to granting immunity to any "executive officer"). At least one
court has applied a similar standard to federal officers. See Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d
129 (1st Cir. 1965).
127. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 42 U.S.L.W. 4543, 4546 (U.S. April 17, 1974). See Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
128, See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910), discussed at note 36 supra.
129. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
130. See text accompanying notes 135-41 infra.

August 1974]

Government Information

1607

tential harassment or disruption, but the :financial and human costs
involved in defending a citizens' action even at the preliminary stage
may have an adverse effect upon government operation and employee
morale.131 These possible costs, combined with the £acts that the
government employee may be judgment-proof132 and may not have
personally profited from the disclosure, argue convincingly that the
citizens' action should not reach the government employee. '
The target of the citizens' action would thus be the third-party
recipient of confidential information. As pointed out above,1 33 the
third party is usually the instigator and principal beneficiary of the
employee's breach of fiduciary duty. Striking at the third-party
recipient should therefore substantially prevent the misuse of government resources.134

2. Phase Two-:-A Substantial Likelihood of Success
on the Merits
By its nature the citizens' action may challenge not only the integrity of the government employee who releases confidential information and the third party who uses it, but also the integrity of those
who control executive institutions. Unwarranted but highly publicized citizens' actions might unnecessarily erode the public's confidence in the government.135 Also, attempts to secure evidence to
substantiate claims of unauthorized disclosure by deposing employees
and inspecting records may disrupt agency operations.136 There is
131. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
132. The average annual salaries of federal civil service employees were $9,234 in
1970, $10,062 in 1971, and $10,981 in 1972. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
AnSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 406 (1973).
133. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
134. The objection might be raised that the potential threat of a citizens' action
would discourage dealings with the government. The high degree of regulation of
government contracts, however, does not seem significantly to discourage dealing. The
economic gains to be derived from government contracts seem to outweigh the possible risks. There is no reason to believe that the honest businessman will be dissuaded
from dealing with the government because of the existence of a citizens' action any
more than he is dissuaded by regulation of government contracts.
135. Cf, Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir, 1971); Homburger, supra note 83, at 345-46.
136. Note, however, that the citizens' action plaintiff may have some difficulty obtaining access to government information and records. See Environmental PI9tection
Agency V, Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l). One
treatise states:
The United States has, or claims to have, a number of privileges that are
unique to it.
The United States has, or has claimed, (1) a privilege not to disclose the identity
of informers, (2) a privilege for military or state secrets, (3) a privilege for certain
reports to the government that are made confidential by statute, (4) a general
privilege under the "housekeeping" statute, and (5) a constitutional privilege to
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even some possibility that unscrupulous plaintiffs would use the
threat of a citizens• action, with its resulting adverse publicity, to
coerce out-of-court settlements from potential defendants.187
These adverse consequences are not completely avoidable. Qualitatively similar dangers pervade shareholder derivative suits,138 however, and they have been minimized by a judicial requirement that
the plaintiff make a preliminary showing of substantial likelihood of
success on the merits before the action proceeds further. 130 A similar
requirement in the citizens• action context would substantially diminish the danger that unfounded suits would be filed for improper
purposes.140 The point at which the showing would be required could
be varied with the need for preliminary discovery. Harassment in
the discovery process could be controlled by the courts' issuance of
appropriately restrictive discovery orders.141
refuse to disclose whatever the executive chooses to keep secret.
8 C. WRIGHT &: A. MILLER, supra note 82, § 2019. But see note 105 supra.
137. CJ. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966) (discussion of
strike suits); Homburger, supra note 83, at 381.
l38. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.
1971).
139. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966); Carpenter v.
Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1144 (S.D. Tex. 1970) ("substantial possibility of prevailing
after 'putting up a real ••• fight'"); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 502 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), revd. on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971). See also 'IA C. WRIGHT &: A.
MILLER, supra note 82, § 1785; Homburger, supra note 83, at 368.
The recent Supreme Court Decision in Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 42 U.S.L.W.
4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974), held that rule 23 does not authorize or permit a court to
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether
it may be maintained as a class action. Such "mini-bearings," the Court reasoned, could
result in substantial prejudice to the defendant because the tentative findings made by
the judge at the hearing, which is not governed by the traditional rules of evidence,
might color his views of the subsequent proceedings. 42 U.S.LW. at 4810. The Court
did not suggest that there was any constitutional prohibition upon the procedure.
Although Eisen was a rule 23 class action case, its rationale appears to apply also
to shareholder derivative actions under rule 23.1, and it could reach the proposed
citizens' action as well. The easy solution would be to enact specific authorization for
a preliminary hearing on the merits. There is no suggestion in Eisen that such a stat•
ute would be invalid. In any case, the preliminary hearing is not an indispensable
element of the proposed citizens' action. It is intended to reduce the likelihood of
frivolous claims, but it could be eliminated if the Supreme Coun's assertion that the
defendant may be substantially prejudiced is accepted. An alternative to elimination
that might meet the Court's argument would be to require different judges for the
preliminary hearings and the trial.
140. The standard-substantial likelihood of success, reasonable grounds, probable
cause, or some other standard-would have a very significant impact upon the operation of the citizens' action. A high standard would make it more difficult for the
plaintiff to succeed, which would possibly decrease the prophylactic and stimulus
values of the proposal.
141. Time limits may be set, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(2); the method of discovery may
be specified, Fm. R. Crv. P. 26(c)(3); and limitations on the scope of discovery and the
persons present at discovery may be imposed, F.ED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(4), (5). Cf., e.g.,
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C. Comparison and Conclusions
Many proposals are being advanced to deal with government
corruption and misuse of government office, perhaps because of the
Watergate affair and related events. Most of these proposals have
weaknesses not shared by the citizens' action. For example, some
reformers would depoliticize the Department of Justice by separating
it from the White House.142 Presently, however, the priorities of the
Department of Justice are the priorities of the executive branch.
Usually these priorities are in harmony with the philosophical and
policy goals of the administration and upon which the administration
was elected. Excellent examples are the civil rights priority of the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations and the antitrust activity of
the Taft administration. The ability of the executive branch to channel legal enforcement toward new national priorities might be lost
if the Department of Justice were "depoliticized."143
River Plate Corp. v. Forestal Land, Timber & Ry. Co., 185 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (limiting discovery to jurisdiction issue).
•
The potential for harassment may also be reduced by application of the res
judicata doctrine. The fear that an ill-prepared, underfunded, or hasty action would
foreclose the vindication of the public's interest, cf. Cramton & Boyer, supra note 111,
at 427-38 n.70, should be discounted in light of the court's power to require adequate
representation. Cf. Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 § 5(3), MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1205(3) (Supp. 1974) (allows doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to be applied despite possibility that an adverse decision in a citizens'
action under that Act may foreclose a government agency action based upon the same
facts).
The prediction that federal courts and government officials will be overburdened
with citizens' actions, cf. Sax & Conner, supra note 116, at 1007; Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 300 (1973), would also
be groundless when the high cost of such litigation is considered. See, e.g., Scott, supra
note 93, at 673-74:
Litigation in general is decidedly expensive. • • • The initial litigation over the
FPC's approval of Consolidated Edison's Storm King reservoir cost the plaintiff
conservat1onist organization over $250,000. While hardly typical, it dramatizes the
fact that despite the subsidization of court costs, the remaining private costs of
litigation are quite sufficient to serve as an initial screening barrier of considerable height. When the "floodgates" of litigation are opened to some new class
of controversy by a decision, it is notable how rarely one can discern the flood
that the dissenters feared. The plaintiff • • • must feel strongly enough about the
issue in question to pay the bills, and that • • • cuts down the flood • • • • [Footnote omitted.]
In any case, the costs of litigation must be weighed against the interests served by
allowing the litigation.
142. E.g., S. 2803, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ("A BILL To insure the Separation of
Constitutional powers by establishing the Department of Justice as an independent
establishment of the United States''); 120 CONG. REc. S. 6416 (daily ed. April 29, 1974)
(Senator Byrd on behalf of Senator Bentsen); Lewis, Quis Custodiet1, N.Y. Times, Feb.
11, 1974, at 35, col. 1 (late city ed.); N.Y. Times, March 21, 1974, at 33, coL 3 (late city
ed.) (panel of public administration experts recommend to Senate Watergate Commitee that Justice Department be depoliticized).
143. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 142; Witnesses oppose Independent Justice Department, 32 CoNc. Q. WEEKLY REP. 796 (1974) (testimony of Ramsey Clark, Theodore
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Another suggestion is that internal government problems become
the responsibility of a permanent special prosecutor144 or an independent agency that would have as its sole responsibility the investigation and prosecution of violations of federal conflict of interest
statutes and civil actions involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duty
by government employees.145 The wisdom of establishing another
bureaucracy to deal with problems of this nature is questionable.
I£ the special prosecutor or the agency were to rely on other departments for investigative and legal personnel, the possibility that
improper influence would be used to prevent prosecution of claims
and individuals would still exist. In any case, there is little reason
to believe that even an independently staffed and funded office would
not ultimately become subject to the same political, monetary, or
manpower constraints that hamper present enforcement efforts.
In contrast to other alternatives, the citizens' action would not
use government resources or personnel and it would not require a
new bureaucracy with all of the attendant costs. Furthermore, established procedures, such as government civil or criminal suits and
administrative action, would not be discarded. The citizens' action
would only supplement these procedures and perhaps stimulate their
use by those who are primarily responsible for protecting the public
interest. The goal of all the proposals is the same-efficient, responsible government-but the citizens' action offers the most effective
means of achieving this goal at the least cost and with minimum
departure from established methods.
Sorenson, and Robert Dixon, Jr., on proposals to separate the Justice Department from
the executive branch (S. 2803) and to authorize a study of the need for a permanent
special prosecutor (S. 2978)).
144. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 142 (discusses proposed by Lloyd Cutler, prominent
Washington lawyer, at conference of Committee for Public Justice).
145. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 142 (discusses proposal of Professor Paul Mishkin for
creating an office of Counsel General of the United States with broad warrant to investigate and respond to complaints of abuses of official power); N.Y. Times, May 1'7,
1973, at 49, col. 7 (late city ed.) (proposal of former Manhattan District Attorney Frank
Hogan in speech before New York Criminal Bar Association).

